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United Nations Peacekeeping Operations  
and the Use of Force 
 
Ruth Wedgwood∗ 
The question of United Nations peacekeeping and the use of force 
might seem to be a specialized topic. However, it is at the root of 
much of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the United 
Nations (UN)–both inside and outside the organization. When one 
views the UN up close, in the field and in New York, much of the 
unsteadiness in discharging its missions stems from the 
organization’s deep ambivalence about the proper use of force in 
international conflict resolution and its hobbled ability to muster 
efficacious force. 
Originally, in the midst of World War II, the UN was not a 
building on First Avenue, but the anti-fascist alliance itself. The UN 
included America’s major allies in the war, namely Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, China, and France. The major enemy states were Nazi 
Germany, fascist Italy, and—though later for the Soviet Union—an 
imperial Japan.1 So if provenance is any guide, the UN anticipated a 
future as a robust organization. Indeed, if you look at the UN Charter 
of 1945 in its closing paragraphs, Article 106 posits what the alliance 
should do in the interim period before a UN security council was 
established. It supposes that the world war allies would continue to 
consult and take such action as they thought necessary for 
international peace and security, including action against any 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Yale Law School, and Senior Fellow for International 
Organizations and Law, Council on Foreign Relations.  Professor Wedgwood has recently 
undertaken research trips to UN peacekeeping and observation missions in Bosnia, Eastern 
Slavonia, Macedonia, Haiti, Georgia, and East Timor. 
 1. See The United Nations Declaration, Jan. 1, 1942, E.A.S. No. 236, DEP’T. ST. PUB. 
1732 (“Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, 
against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at 
war.”); The Moscow Declarations, DEP’T. ST. BULL., Oct. 30, 1943, at 307ff.  
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resurgence of fascism.  
 The original scheme was to endow the security council with 
designated military forces under agreements with member states 
pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter. There was even supposed to be 
a UN air force, as stated in Article 45 of the Charter, with committed 
air assets from member states. However, the only air power now used 
by the UN is commercially leased surplus planes and helicopters 
from the former Soviet bloc and the occasional U-2 deployed by the 
Special Commission on Iraq to look for weapons of mass destruction 
hidden by Baghdad. So any association between the UN and a tepid 
response to aggression was not part of the original conception. 
However, after World War II, the confrontation with Communist 
countries began. With the Cold War underway, things fell apart and 
the UN’s political machinery no longer operated as smoothly as 
intended. The Security Council froze-up in the ideological schism of 
the Cold War. With veto power guaranteed by the Charter to the 
permanent members, including the Soviet Union, very little could be 
accomplished through the Chapter 7 mechanism to muster armed 
forces in collective military action. The Security Council was given 
no committed forces under Article 43, and even now, a half century 
later, no country is willing to precommit its forces to UN 
deployment.  
Peacekeeping was born in the interstices of the UN Charter. The 
famous joke is that peacekeeping is authorized under chapter “6½” of 
the Charter–halfway between the Security Council’s procedures for 
conciliation and its procedures for deploying force. Peacekeeping 
was supposed to be limited and was intended as an interpositional 
buffer, an armed observation force designed to discourage 
adversaries from violating a ceasefire or peace agreement. Yet in 
reality it was a minimal show of force, almost a form of bird 
watching, by men who happened to wear uniforms. Peacekeepers 
kept apart parties to a truce and discouraged nighttime forays and 
border encounters. Having neutral observers on the border gave a bit 
of dignity to the fact of separation. It gave the parties a reason why 
they were not obliged to “have at” each other every foggy night. 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada, Under-Secretary-
General Ralph Bunche, and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold 
invented the institution of peacekeeping for situations such as Sinai 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/8
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and Cyprus, and, with less success, for the Congo. Initially, its 
funding was quite problematic. France and Russia were unhappy with 
the operations in Sinai and the Congo and refused to pay their dues. 
This led to the famous advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), holding that peacekeeping was not an ultra vires 
occupation for the UN.2 In the course of the decision, however, at 
least one judge on the ICJ cautioned that the UN should not become 
so expensive that its members could not afford membership.3 Perhaps 
in response to that problem, the United States and the other 
permanent members of the Security Council have traditionally paid 
an extra amount for the expenses of peacekeeping, which rose to 
almost four times the UN regular budget in the mid 1990s.  
The classical account of peacekeeping states that at least three 
conditions must be met for peacekeeping to work: first, consent of 
parties to the peacekeepers’ presence, upon entry and throughout the 
mission; second, the minimal use of force, mustering arms only in 
self-defense; and third, neutrality between the parties principally 
because peacekeeping was not an attempt to change the outcome of a 
war or conflict. This is the view of older UN hands such as Sir 
Marrack Goulding and Sir Brian Urquhart, and the reason why some 
people in the UN firmly believed that the organization should not go 
into Bosnia. The moral adequacy of “neutrality” has been contested 
when the UN deploys in circumstances where one side is the 
aggressor or abuses the laws of war.  
Peacekeeping was also shaped by the Cold War. It was assumed 
that superpowers should not take part in peacekeeping because they 
were not neutral. Smaller countries, often the neutrals of Scandinavia 
or developing nations, were the stalwart troop contributors for 
peacekeeping. The deployment of peacekeepers was a method of 
preventing small conflicts from becoming occasions for major 
confrontation.4  
 
 2. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20). 
 3. Id. at 302 (Bustamante, J., dissenting) (“at the time of the signature of the Charter, … 
[n]obody foresaw that the increase in expenditure of the United Nations could one day endanger 
the solvency of national budgets”). 
 4. In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, surrogate conflicts fueled by the 
conflicting sympathies of major powers were newly capable of solution, and peacekeepers 
deployed to places such as Cambodia and Central America.   
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Peacekeeping had its disappointments even in the early, classical 
phase. It worked reasonably well in Cyprus during the 1960s, but the 
UN was powerless to prevent enosis, the attempt of Athens to 
integrate the island into Greece, or to resist the Turkish military 
intervention in 1974. There were also complaints that the blue line of 
peacekeepers permanently divided the island, thus freezing the 
conflict and giving each side an excuse not to negotiate.  
The Congo intervention was a bloody mess, as shown by Sir Brian 
Urquhart’s wonderful memoir. Sir Brian’s recollections, entitled A 
Life in Peace and War, limn the larger-than-life quality of some of 
the early UN figures. He notes drolly that on one troop transport, a 
blue UN flag was draped across the train engine. The entourage was 
greeted by the question of a Congolese official: “L’ONU? C’est quel 
tribu?” or “what tribe is the UN?”5 Even in the 1960s the UN lacked 
credibility on the ground. 
Yet after the end of the Cold War, the Security Council returned 
to work, and there was great anticipation of its potential in the 1990s. 
Many supposed that the UN would be able to act vigorously and with 
unity. This optimism was fueled by the unity of response in 1991 
against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and also by the rather unique period 
when a series of local conflicts diminished because there were no 
longer major patrons from the east-west struggle. Further, a peace 
agreement was reached in Cambodia, with cooperation from China 
and the ASEAN countries. The civil conflicts in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Angola were no longer 
freighted with east-west rivalry, although the world soon learned that 
ethnic rivalry could be equally contentious. There was astronomical 
growth in the number of peacekeepers deployed on the ground–up to 
70,000 in the mid 1990s. The UN’s peacekeeping operations 
department was not equipped to handle the logistics of so many 
operations, and was often unable to find properly trained or 
disciplined troops, or to marry-up third-world brigades with modern 
equipment. Of course, as the numbers increased, the cost increased as 
well. It was largely the soaring cost of peacekeeping that provoked 
the United State’s refusal to pay its assessments.  
 
 5. BRIAN URQUHART, A LIFE IN PEACE AND WAR 149 (1987). 
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The peacekeeping of the 1990s was a new kind of operation. It 
was not just interpositional observation, or monitoring a peace 
accord. It often involved attempts to scale back a conflict and 
demobilize opposing forces even before there was any assurance of a 
binding ceasefire. Peacekeeping was attempted where there was no 
peace to keep–so the saying went. UN forces were asked to provide 
security for a host of new tasks in civil reconstruction such as the 
demobilization of guerrilla and government forces, the collection and 
caching of arms, emergency assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and organizing democratic elections for post-
conflict governments. The UN attempted to become a full service 
provider for broken societies, in awkward coordination with regional 
agencies and frameworks such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of American States. 
Multifunctional peacekeeping was not just the work of soldiers but of 
many other UN agencies, including many that depend on voluntary 
contributions rather than mandatory dues. The High Commissioner 
for Refugees, for example, proved to be a key figure in this period. 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had high 
expectations for peacekeeping in the 1990s, as outlined in An Agenda 
for Peace.6 He even supposed that the UN might finally obtain 
assigned troops, deployable at will, under Article 43 agreements. 
That did not come to pass. Even the hope for standby troops 
earmarked for UN operations by member states fell prey to the 
realities of local politics and reluctant publics. Willingness to 
intervene with national contingents depended on the sympathies of a 
particular conflict, as well as the likelihood of success. The standby 
list was often a dance card for countries’ right to say “no.” Eighty or 
more countries would happily field telephone calls from the thirty-
eighth floor of the UN Secretariat building, and then say it was not 
the right struggle for them. Yet there was a mood of anticipation in 
the early 1990s about what the UN and the accepted warrant of its 
authority for intervention might mean.  
 
 6. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of 
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277-
S/24111 (1992). 
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Disillusionment followed shortly thereafter. First, these conflicts 
involved a different kind of warfare. Ethnic wars engaged nonstate 
actors–singled minded groups lacking the full panoply of interests 
and linkages that often moderate the behavior of governments. 
Conflicts were fueled by opportunistic mercantile warlords such as 
those currently in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Congo, where 
diamonds and timber keep insurgencies going. These all-terrain 
conflicts do not lend themselves to interpositional peacekeeping. 
Indeed, there often are no organized command structures with which 
to negotiate. Intermingled populations, unconventional warfare, the 
deliberate targeting of civilians, the strategy of threatening 
peacekeepers and even taking them hostage, make this 
unconventional warfare; often the UN has not known how to cope. 
Blue berets were exchanged for blue helmets. The sense of 
vulnerability reached an apex in missions such as Rwanda, where the 
Hutu Interehamwe deliberately killed Belgian peacekeepers and 
propelled their withdrawal, and Somalia, where the urban forces of 
Mohammed Aidid—later shown to have been trained by Osama bin 
Laden–killed eighteen United States Rangers. This was not the 
tactically simpler task of interpositional peacekeeping, but rather an 
attempt to counter forces that know how to exploit the concerns of 
western democracies regarding the safety of their citizen-soldiers.  
The apparent incapacity of UN troops to provide protection to the 
civilian populations they were sent to aid was equally troublesome. 
The deadly attrition of the Bosnian war killed 200,000 civilians out of 
a population of four million, and also displaced 800,000 people as 
refugees or internally displaced persons. The siege of Sarajevo saw 
Serb forces on the surrounding hills, heartlessly sniping at civilians 
and bombarding the town. The Sarajevo government was suspected 
by some, even inside the UN, of enhancing the visuals for a CNN war 
by setting up their own civilians as targets. Ultimately, observers 
witnessed the tragedy of Srebrenica in the Drina Valley where lightly 
armed Dutch peacekeeping forces did not, and perhaps could not, 
protect the civilian population, and 7,000 combat-age Muslim men 
and boys were summarily executed by the Bosnian Serbs.7  
 
 7. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: 
The Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (1999). 
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Similarly, in Rwanda the UN and its member states disappointed 
many observers by failing to act in the face of the Hutu genocide 
against the Tutsi. The Secretariat disregarded warnings early in 1994 
that genocidal plans might be in preparation. When the killing began, 
the UN forces of the “UNAMIR” mission were pulled out by their 
national commands, including the Belgians, Ghanaians, and 
Bangladeshi, and no other intervention force was mounted by the 
Security Council.8  
The heart of the failure was minimalism in the use of force. 
Whether a matter of philosophy or political skittishness, the UN and 
its members have often proved unwilling to use armed force in 
circumstances where a robust deployment might be effective. 
Observers often ascribed this to member states’ reluctance to 
jeopardize their forces. Failure to deploy robustly may also signal an 
implicit sympathy with one of the sides in the conflict. However, it is 
also engendered by an ethos of nonviolence within the United 
Nations itself–a lingering doubt about the necessary use of defensive 
force in the international community, and perhaps a belief that the 
thin personality of a multilateral organization cannot sustain the 
morally contentious choices that are made by nation states in defense 
of their own existence.9 As a result, UN forces were put on the 
ground in Bosnia with the very limited mandate of delivering food 
and humanitarian assistance. To some, this seemed to be a replay of 
the moral indifference that characterized Europe during the rise of 
fascism; peacekeepers standing by as terrible things were done 
because it was not their department to stop it. Ultimately, when 
Boutros-Ghali went to the Security Council and asked for the creation 
of internal safe areas within Bosnia for the protection of civilians, he 
was not given the troops he wanted. Seven thousand troops were 
allocated, instead of the 34,000 recommended by his military 
 
 8. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, annexed to Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999). 
 9. When military force is not used in an intelligent and morally responsible way, it 
sometimes leads the international community to use other forms of coercion, such as economic 
sanctions, which can be much harder on a civilian population, as we have seen in Haiti and Iraq. 
Attitudes towards the discrete use of military force must take account of the often greater cost 
of alternatives.  
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advisors. At that point, many thought that the Secretary-General 
should have resigned, or at least have said that he could not be party 
to a deception and refused to implement the safe area mandate.  
With great melancholy, I recall my visit to the Hague in July, 
1995. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
was in its early months of operation. We had a pleasant dinner with 
prosecutor Richard Goldstone and then listened with horror to the 
television on the fall of Srebrenica. The Dutch contingent was placed 
inside the safe zone with deliberately scaled down equipment. The 
armored personnel carriers were stripped of the twenty millimeter 
cannons that are standard NATO equipment. This, after all, was 
peacekeeping. As with the Canadian troops who preceded them, the 
Dutch had also been helpless to prevent the Muslim forces in 
Srebrenica from taking up positions behind UN observation posts and 
firing out to draw incoming Serb fire. This was a debacle of 
peacekeeping in its classical mode with minimal use of force, the 
pretense of consent, neutrality between the parties, and above all, the 
attempt to avoid antagonizing the local combatants in a way that 
might endanger UN personnel. After Srebrenica, “neutrality” was 
understandably seen as a hollow word, and some began to entertain 
the idea of peacekeepers’ right—or even duty—to use force for 
mission accomplishment, including the mission of protecting 
civilians. 
The experience in Somalia was, of course, a major source of 
American anxiety over peacekeeping. The peacekeeping mission 
began with famine relief, but devolved into an attempt to restore a 
democratic structure to Somalia, without understanding the great 
depth of the clan structure. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s past 
career in the Egyptian foreign ministry, with responsibility for 
Egypt’s policy towards Africa, ultimately thwarted the UN’s 
acceptance of him as a local mediator, because Egypt had had distinct 
sympathies for Siad Barre, a prominent rival of Aidid. Somalia 
became a cataclysmic event for American involvement with 
peacekeeping. Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed while on a 
food delivery mission in Mogadushi in June, 1993, and twenty-four 
peacekeepers were killed. Then in October, 1993, American Rangers 
attempted to raid an arms cache and were ambushed in a shootout in 
downtown Mogadishu. Eighteen Americans were killed and seventy-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/8
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five wounded. The news was punctuated by a terrible photograph of a 
slain American GI whose body was degraded in the streets. As a 
result, Somalia became a watershed event, diminishing American 
support of UN peacekeeping.  
The trauma of Somalia was largely responsible for the subsequent 
hesitation of support for intervention to stop the Hutu genocide in 
Rwanda. The United States declined to support any follow-on force 
to UNAMIR, and the genocide rolled on unabated until the Tutsi 
military advance succeeded. When the Hutu fled to the southwest, the 
French mounted a unilateral mission that gave them shelter as they 
crossed the border into Zaire. Yet, even as the Hutu fled from refugee 
camps besieged by the Tutsi, there were scenes of needless violence, 
marked with the same UN passivity. A memoir by an Australian aid 
worker10 recounts how Australian peacekeepers were instructed to 
hold their fire when Tutsi forces began to shoot into an encampment 
of Hutu civilians at Kibeho. Witnesses reported that 2,000 to 4,000 
civilians were killed, though the official UN figure is much lower.  
The UN is sometimes inclined to airbrush its disasters, thus 
avoiding the repercussions and lessons of traumatic or embarrassing 
events. In doing so, the organization does itself a disservice. In An 
Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali had hoped that regional 
organizations might take on much of the burden of peacekeeping. 
There was a period in the mid-1990s when many thought that 
existing regional organizations were up to the task. Nigeria and 
Ghana intervened in the civil conflict in Liberia under the aegis of a 
subregional organization called the Economic Organization of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and its military arm called ECOMOG.11 
The Security Council ultimately commended the intervention, despite 
the creditable argument that the exercise prolonged the conflict. 
However, it was not immediately recognized that the peacekeepers 
themselves could be a source of disorder. The ECOMOG forces were 
poorly disciplined and, too often, abused local civilians.  
The real peacekeeping lesson of the last ten years is that the idea 
of separating Chapter 6½ from Chapter 7 is not realistic. 
Peacekeeping is not segregable from robust peace enforcement. Too 
 
 10. STEVE PRATT, DUTY OF CARE 74-76 (2000). 
 11. See generally FUNMI OLONISAKIN, REINVENTING PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA (2000). 
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many situations quickly turn sour, and one cannot always predict the 
course of events in advance. One almost needs a “Powell-
Weinberger” doctrine for the UN itself, a willingness to go in with 
overwhelming force with the confidence that the capacity to respond 
is the best guarantee of cooperation. It is an illusion that the 
international personality of the UN will suffice to deter combatants in 
civil conflicts, and this illusion has repeatedly led to disaster. There is 
now quite a change of view in New York, a chaste feeling that the 
capacity to do peacekeeping in challenging environments is limited. 
The recent events of Sierra Leone have certainly justified that 
modesty.  
At the same time, other problems have developed. There has been 
resentment among developing countries because the staffing of the 
UN peacekeeping operations department was enlarged through 
loaned and donated personnel from the first world. The General 
Assembly’s concern for fair representation of poor as well as 
prosperous countries was not unjustified. Yet, at a time of budgetary 
strictures and burgeoning peacekeeping operations, the General 
Assembly imposed a flat rule that seconded personnel could no 
longer assist in peacekeeping support and coordination. Thus, the 
peacekeeping operations department was stripped of key operators 
with institutional knowledge. The presence of seconded personnel 
had also been important in building effective ties with key militaries 
active in peacekeeping. The General Assembly’s precipitous action 
diminished the ability to provide effective support to field operations.  
There are several hard questions for the UN. First, there needs to 
be a philosophical discussion on the use of force. Inadequate force 
structures are often ascribed to the reluctance of member countries to 
contribute troops. However, the problem is deeper than that. It 
amounts to an unwillingness to admit that collective security requires 
robust action, that the United Nations cannot substitute itself for 
nation states and hope to eschew the modalities found necessary by 
nation states. The tradition of nonviolence and neutrality in 
peacekeeping might, in honor of some of its founders, be called a 
“Nordic minimalism.” It is a Kantian ideal that words should be 
sufficient, but they are often not. It also betrays an ambivalence about 
the moral personality of multilateral organizations and a doubt as to 
whether they are competent to use the tools of military force because 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol5/iss1/8
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violence is an instrumental evil. It means that peacekeeping has 
become a temporizing tactic, in lieu of more effective action.  
Second, there is a question of competence. In practice, the 
national contingents that take part in peacekeeping do not answer to 
the UN force commander. If the UN commander wants to move a 
battalion ten miles down the road in a disputed area, he must wait for 
the head of the national contingent to get permission. There really is 
no such thing as an integrated UN military force. The absence of 
effective logistics, transport, and on-the-ground intelligence means 
that peacekeepers are often vulnerable targets justifiably worried 
about unit safety and hardly able to focus on mission 
accomplishment. If peacekeeping cannot be done well, perhaps its 
should not be done it at all. Certainly when the UN thrusts itself into 
situations and promises people protection, there needs to be a realistic 
assessment of the capacity to muster defensive force. 
In the mid-1990s, there was a passing discussion about having a 
standing army for the UN, a multinational rapid reaction force of 
perhaps 5,000 soldiers. The idea was tabled on grounds of budget and 
difficulty, as well as concern about political control. It would not be 
easy to take volunteer soldiers from different military backgrounds 
and form a coherent unit, even after joint training. A unit’s coercive 
force also depends on the composition of its backup, and that again 
leaves the UN in the position of “dialing for doughboys.” Even the 
numbers were not persuasive; 5,000 slots do not go as far as one 
might suppose. There is a rotational system, usually with a three-to-
one ratio, in military deployments. This means one soldier is on the 
ground in the mission, one is training to replace him, and one is 
returning from service. The operational limits of a 5,000 man force 
are also shown by another divisor, the so-called “tooth to tail” ratio. 
To field a soldier at the sharp end of the stick requires numerous 
support and logistical personnel. The accepted ratio is between 3-1 
and 6-1, depending on whether the European view or the American 
view is used. Thus, a stand-alone base force of 5,000 would yield a 
quite modest number of infantry peacekeepers on the ground—no 
more than 600. Further, military deployments cannot safely be 
mounted in an ad hoc fashion, like a “pick-up” basketball team. 
Participants must be trained together over a long period of time. A 
standing force would have to be some sort of foreign legion, not just 
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an occasional gathering of retired military personnel. With these 
daunting problems, it is not surprising the idea was tabled. 
Since that time, no one has known quite what to do. The UN has 
relied on “coalitions of the willing” made up of national military 
units, but even here there are real problems of competence because 
there is no occasion to have practice deployments. The UN recently 
inquired into what went wrong in Sierra Leone. In particular, it 
questioned how the Zambian contingent was taken hostage by an 
insurgent group known as the West Side Boys, stripped of their 
uniforms and weapons, and threatened with the death of their unit 
commander. As a result, the UN uncovered the following 
information. The Zambians deployed into Sierra Leone and were 
directed to enter an area where their Nigerian predecessors had not 
dared to tread. They were inadequately briefed about the nature of the 
threat. They had one radio and an out-of-date map. The force 
commander, along with a small contingent, was proceeding in 
advance of the rest of the Zambian column. The West Side Boys, 
comprised of child soldiers, confronted the Zambian commander at a 
roadblock, took him to see their own commander, and informed him 
that his soldiers must surrender to avoid a Salomé-like decapitation. 
Because the commander had the only radio, he could not warn the 
rest of his troops. Consequently, several hundred Zambian soldiers 
were forced to lay down their arms and surrender their uniforms. The 
West Side Boys used the Zambian uniforms as camouflage in later 
attacks against Nigerian peacekeepers elsewhere in the back 
country.12  
The UN hoped that fielding a large force in Sierra Leone would be 
sufficient to restore order, but the Indian force commander did not get 
along with the Nigerian contingent. The Jordanian and Indian 
contingents ultimately were withdrawn, and the British chose to 
remain entirely outside the UN command structure. These examples 
indicate that the problem of multinational cacophony is hard to solve 
by means other than the use of prior existing military organizations 
such as NATO or Partnership for Peace brigades that have practiced 
together and developed a common ethos.  
 
 12. To distinguish themselves from the masquerading “peacekeepers,” the Nigerians then 
removed all UN insignia from their own uniforms.   
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Why did UN forces not go into Rwanda? In part it was due to 
American objections following the events of Somalia. These 
objectors were wary of an adversary that had already murdered 
Belgian peacekeepers for political effect. In addition, there was still 
no viable combination of troops and equipment. Some African 
countries were willing to supply troops, but had no vehicles or 
armored personnel carriers. Even if equipment had been immediately 
supplied, unfamiliar troops still needed to be trained in its operation. 
One practical longterm response is to train regional forces, and the 
United States is now doing that in Senegal and elsewhere.  
The third problem is a version of the Hippocratic oath, “first do no 
harm.” There must be a moral self-consciousness about the UN’s 
duty to avoid damaging the areas in which it intervenes. The 
troubling reports of peacekeeper misconduct are anecdotal, they are 
not written down. How were troops recruited for Cambodia? At least 
one UN member state took men out of jail, gave them blue berets, 
and sent them off. Some contingents were eventually sent home 
because they were not helping anyone and were looting the 
countryside. The problems of corruption among UNPROFOR 
contingents in Bosnia were well-known; some Eastern European 
troops used their armored personnel carriers to smuggle consumer 
appliances into the city for resale. Equally disturbing is the politically 
difficult issue of HIV-positive troops. Some years ago, even before 
the AIDS crisis was so acute, the UN inadvertently obtained the full 
medical files of a national peacekeeping contingent and discovered 
that 65% of the blue berets were HIV-positive. The Secretariat sent 
the contingent home quietly by redesigning the areas of operation. 
However, the UN declined to institute any policy of testing, or even 
asking, for the voluntary disclosure of medical information from 
troop-donating countries. There are some good reasons for this 
decision. What if the consequence of testing is to force a military 
man into unemployment, with no treatment for him or his wife? Why 
HIV testing and not liver function testing? Yet, there is still the real 
problem of men with guns, far from home. Certainly in the choice 
among national contingents, the epidemiological hazard is a 
reasonable consideration.  
Another part of the Hippocratic oath is the duty not to abandon 
people who have relied on a promise of protection. Michael 
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Hourigan, an Atlanta lawyer, has been arguing this point. He brought 
a claim against the UN stemming from the Rwanda massacres, on 
behalf of two families. One was the family of the former Chief 
Justice of Rwanda and the other was the family of the former minister 
of labor and social affairs. UNAMIR troops had been assigned to 
guard the homes and safety of these two families, but when the Hutu 
militia came up, the troops allegedly left and the families were 
killed.13 Hourigan’s claim is that if an organization promises 
protection, it has a moral and perhaps a legal duty to make good on 
the promise. The UN initially answered that such a claim was 
grounded in public law, not in private law, and therefore lacked an 
available claims procedure. Hourigan quickly recast the claim within 
the private law language of wrongful death. Regardless of the 
resolution of this particular claim, the larger point is that the UN too 
often has been satisfied with the appearance of peacekeeping, a 
charade of protection, instead of effective protection of civilian 
populations. The lack of credibility in UN deployments undermines 
its every other function, including post-conflict reconstruction. 
Refugees will not return to the areas from which minorities are 
“cleansed” when there is no real assurance of safety. The arrest of 
war criminals in Bosnia and the control of organized crime in East 
Timor and Kosovo depend on a willingness to use force in policing. 
Even thwarting corruption, which has throttled the economy of 
Bosnia, requires a force strong enough to suppress possible 
retaliation. Several international corporations have tried to go into 
Bosnia to revive industrial work and provide employment but they 
have been frustrated by the tangle of political control of the economy 
by the nationalist political parties and the rank and repetitive 
corruption.14 Why can’t the international community confront this 
more directly or even arrest people for corruption? Part of the reason 
is diffidence, but part of it is danger. One does not dare step-up 
confrontations or make arrests because security on the ground is 
 
 13. See Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 8, at 44; Minutes of Meeting Between Survivors of 
the Rwandan Genocide and the Independent Inquiry into the United Nation’s Role in the 
Rwandan Genocide, Rayburn House Office Building, Dec. 8, 1999 (on file with author). 
 14. International Crisis Group, Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina?, 
available at http://www.crisisweb.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2001). 
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ineffective.  
There is now a serious conversation about international policing, 
and how to restore a minimum degree of law and order in post-
conflict arenas.15 President Bush’s foreign affairs adviser, 
Condoleezza Rice, has noted her concern about the mid-level security 
gap in post-conflict areas.16 If peacekeepers eschew the tasks of 
policing and CIVPOL personnel assigned to the UN’s volunteer 
international police force limit their functions to giving advice on 
“principles of democratic policing” and lack unit-wide training, then 
we will continue to have situations of tenuous stability such as in 
Bosnia today. We must address how to develop a more robust police 
capability. We need international personnel who are trained in the use 
of fire power and in the special competencies needed for policing, 
including investigative experience and language capability. One may 
wish to have specialized constabulary forces within NATO. Yet, it is 
time to get beyond the fiction that a thrown-together CIVPOL force 
is sufficient for all challenging situations. 
On the American role in peacekeeping, I tell my students that one 
amongst them should found a new political party to be called the 
Liberal Hawks. Washington’s dissatisfaction with peacekeeping 
stems in part from the challenges of our military demobilization since 
the end of the Cold War. Tempted by the crumbling of the Soviet 
Union, both the United States and its NATO allies have scaled back 
their forces, responding to domestic constituencies that prefer to cut 
budgets. Yet in facing a belligerent North Korea and Iraq, there is 
still a need for an army that can effectively fight land battles. There is 
rightful concern about wasting training and overtaxing American 
military personnel. If we take combat recruits and train them to 
operate Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks in an integrated 
land-air campaign, and then take them off their equipment and turn 
them into peacekeepers, and then after their Bosnia rotation, try to 
recoup their combat skills, we will waste a lot of time and manpower. 
 
 15. POLICING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: PEACE OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC SECURITY 
(Robert B. Oakley, et al. eds., 1998); UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND 
RESEARCH,  ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF CIVILIAN POLICE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS: DEBRIEFING AND LESSONS (1996). 
 16. Elaine Sciolino, Bush Aide Hints Police Are Better Peacekeepers Than Military, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A7. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 69 Wedgwood.doc  12/20/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 5:69 
 
 
In addition, the Executive Branch has generally not been willing to 
ask Congress for money up-front for peacekeeping missions. Instead 
the White House has often found it more convenient to raid readiness 
and training money, and then ask Congress to restore these essential 
funds. Admittedly the White House may have feared that Congress 
would just say no if asked to appropriate peacekeeping money as 
such. However, the consequence has been an unhappy cycle of 
robbing Peter and underpaying Paul, thus putting pressure on United 
State’s military readiness. We need to recognize that these missions 
are expensive, that they do take manpower, that they do have an 
operations tempo which wearies military personnel, burdens their 
family life, and causes them to leave the armed forces to join the 
private economy. To sustain these missions, in the configuration of 
our democracy, one needs to muster public support so that Congress 
can be persuaded to fund peacekeeping in a planned way that does 
not deride our other military needs. We cannot keep doing it through 
the backdoor. Though Congress is appropriately concerned about the 
safety of American personnel, the sensible provision of funds is 
necessary even where the United States is involved in supportive 
functions such as logistics, airlift, and intelligence. 
We also need to consider what local political solutions are viable, 
given the constraints of UN peacekeeping capacity. Should we accept 
solutions such as the soft partition of Bosnia, where the so-called 
“inter entity boundary line” separates the Bosnian Serbs from the 
Muslims and Croats, because that allows a military mission much 
closer to the low-impact interpositional peacekeeping of yore? Can 
the political culture of a post-conflict society change through a top-
down Fabian solution, as we are attempting in Bosnia, where the new 
state structure and constitution were implemented as part of the 
Dayton Plan but never endorsed in any popular ballot? There is a real 
challenge for political scientists and sociologists to assess how you 
can craft a solution that allows civic reeducation to take root.  
Finally, there is concern that the international community may 
have been naïve in supposing that elections are the answer to 
everything. Premature parliamentary and municipal elections may in 
fact reify the power of the nationalist political parties, such as the 
SDS and HDZ in Bosnia. Indeed, a popular mandate allows these 
parties to wrap their obstruction in the flag of sovereignty. If we had 
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been a bit more bloody-minded in Bosnia and entertained a 
transitional structure more akin to a protectorate, we may have begun 
to displace the role of organized crime and organized ethnic 
thuggery. 
The people who work inside the United Nations are often 
extremely talented. They work for very little money in dangerous 
places. Yet the most gallant of UN officials are among the most 
frustrated critics of the obstinacy of the institution and its failure to 
come to grips with its deficiencies. There is little close newspaper 
coverage of the UN as an institution, and thus no feedback loop to 
improve agency performance. Too few people know enough about 
the organization to point fingers and name names, or even make 
workable suggestions. There is no room for romantic multilateralism  
if we want the UN to be able to do its job. 
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